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The theory of congestion costs in traffic networks is firm1;y
entrenched in the economic literature on transportation (2), (3), [8).
In the simplest case, which is sufficient for our purposes, a driver
enters a road and willy-nilly increases the travel time of other users,
thus -imposing costs on them equal to the value of the extra time. The
driver does not take these costs into account because he doesn't
experience them; he experiences only his private operating and time
costs which do not include the additional costs he imposes on others.
These additional costs are called congestion costs and are regarded
as an externality. The externality is presumed to create an inefficiency-
that is, a condition in which Social Marginal Cost differs from Social
Marginal Benefits. Such a condition means that resources are not
allocated in the manner that maximizes Social Utility. The recommendation
of modern welfare economics (Which treats the capitalized terms as names
of meaningful concepts) is to impose a tax on drivers sufficient to cover
the congestion costs.
Figure 1, adapted from Bertrand [2), illustrates ,the story.
D(x) is the demand curve, p(x) is the private marginal cost, S(x) is
the Social Marginal Cost, and triangle abc is the Social Utility gained
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by imposing tax t, which reduces usage from the private equilibrium x2
to the Social Optimum ~. Bertrand [2] and Boardman and Lave [3] compute
t for a number of combinations o-r basic parameters. This computation
has become a standard exercise in applied political economy.
Both the reasoning and the welfare-economic views that
motivate it are expressed particularly well by Boardman and Lave [3,
p. 341] in the following passage. the notation of which I have changed
to con-rorm with my own and the emphasis o-r which is mine:
If an individual takes to the highway he experiences· a
(private) cost of P(xl ). Society as a whole experiences
the social marginal cost S(~), which exceeds the private
cost. In order to internalize this cost. the individual
must behave as if he faces a cost equal to the marginal
social cost, rather than the private cost. One way of
making an individual behave in the desired fashion is
to levy a ;'congestion toll." t ••••
These views are widely held. and the quoted passage might well have been
selected by a random process from among many such passages in the literature.
The passage is unusual only in its clear and rapid movement from the
perceived externality to the recommended remedy, almost as.if it were
impatient to get to the really interesting job of inducing people to
behave in the proper manner by taxing them.
Now in practice we do not pay congestion taxes. So it seems







and maintenance, traffic management, and air pollution, it does not pay
its way with respect to congestion costs. Hence it seems to be sub-
sidized by Society As A Whole. This appears to be an additional argument
against the private automobile and is often used as such by advocates
of public transportation. We are not concerned here with the relative
merits of public and private transportation but merely wish to reconsider
the subject of congestion costs and taxes.
Walters' [81 original article on the subject established a
tradition of concern for the proper tax and unconcern for its proper use.
An article by Sharp [71 almost broke this tradition; however, after
expressing his misgivings onthis score he neglected to pursue the matter.
The typical sentiments remain those expressed by Walters:
Problems of the distribution of income-who would and who
would not be harmed by the policy advocated--will not be
considered here. The general ramifications of such a
policy are reasonably clear, but the detailed analysis ,
would be cumbersome and boring. [8, p.6861
In retrospect, this appears to have been a mistake. Equity demands
some consideration, and when we look into it we find a paradox.
Suppose, therefore, that a tax is levied on drivers. Since
its purpose is to ccrrect a pricing failure, the proper disposal of
its revenues is an essential part of the analysis. For this it is
not sufficient to say, with modern welfare economics, that the revenues
should go to Society As A Whole. Society As A Whole has no checking
account and no pockets, so the revenues will go into the accounts or
pockets of particular individuals. Ideally, the beneficiaries will4
be those who bear the congestion costs. Only by compensating those
who bear the costs can we fully correct the apparent misallocation.
And it is clear that travelers, and only travelers, bear congestion
costs. We are not here concerned with pollution, noise, or any other
undesirable by-product of travel except congestion. Clearly these
other costs fall on drivers and non-drivers alike. But congestion
cost is the value of excess travel time, and a person can suffer travel
delays only while traveling. Though travelers include passengers as
well as drivers, for brevity we speak only of drivers. In this sense,
drivers bear all congestion costs.
It is frequently alleged in discussions of the subject (though
I cannot find it stated in print) that non-drivers also bear congestion
costs because congestion keeps them off the roads: They would drive
if the roads were clearer, but.will not when the roads are congested;
hence those who do drive impose costs on those who don't (but otherwise·
would) by depriving them of an opportunity. This reasoning, however,
would establish a proposition that is obviously absurd when applied to
more familiar cases. Thus let apples, for instance, be supplied at
increasing cost and let Jones be willing to pay a nickel but not a
dime for an apple. If other buyers drove the price up to a dime they
would, on the present reasoning, impose a cost on Jones by knocking
him out of the market. But who would imagine it proper to count this
"cost" as part of the Social Cost of apples, and who would want to com-
pensate Jones for "bearing" it? Yet the cases differ only in inessential
details.
Since, therefore, drivers bear all congestion costs, they should
get the tax revenues. As the tax just covers congestion costs, the
revenues (absent administrative costs) are just enough to compensate
all drivers.5
One of the standard simplifying assumptions in the theory is
that all traffic is homogeneous: "with a given volume of traffic, each
vehicle will experience the same costs, speed, etc." [8, p. 677]. This
assumption is clearly required for the concept of a single optimum tax
rate t to be paid by all drivers. On the :further suppositions that (a)
the costsboth borne and imposed by a driver increase with his usage
and (b) no driver enjoys squatter's rights to the road, the situation con-
tains an essential (and apparently overlooked) symmetry: the congestion
cost" borne by a driver equal the congestion costs imposed by him.
In practice, on any particular trip, drivers in front impose
more costs on drivers behind than the latter impose on them. But to
take this into account when taxing would confer a kincl. of squatter's
right on the first driver. For taxing--ancl. dispensing the revenues-
all drivers must receive 'equal treatment for equal usage. In any case,
things even out over a large number of trips. In that statistical sense,
therefore-the only sense appropriate to the proposecl. taxing scheme
ancl. hence to the proper refunding scheme--each driver bears congestion
costs equal to those he imposes.
Incl.eecl., on the homogeneity assumption, the congestion cost
ciJ imposecl. by driver i on driver J equals the cost c
Ji
imposed by J
on 1. The assumption is untrue in particular casesbut the equality
nevertheless remains true in a statistical sense. If driver i follows
immediately behincl. driver J on half the days but immecl.iately precedes ,
him on the other cl.ays, then the cl.aily averages of ciJ ancl. cJi are equal.
Assuming a rancl.om distribution of relative positions over all pairs
of drivers, it follows that a rancl.omly chosen pair cl.elay each other
equally. In practice, the members of a pair will not always value
time equally, but both are expectecl. to value it as the average driver





It follows that each driver should receive 100% of his tax
payment as compensation for the congestion costs he bears. Since
he can only receive this payment by bearing congestion costs and
can only bear those costs when engaging in the congesting activity, the
payment will not induce him to "SUbstitute away" from the activity; rather,
it will lower his private costs by precisely the amount his tax payments
raised the1ll, both being the same function of his usage. Both the pay-
ment and the receipt are "per unit" and not "lump-sum," so no wealth or
substitution effects will change the terms of trade between the con-
. gesting activity and others. Each driver, therefore, will behave
precisely as he would have done had no tax been imposed (and disbursed)
in the first place. Proper dispersal of the revenues precisely restores
the pretax position.*
In short, modern welfare economics began by conceiving an
externality, proposed a tax to eliminate it in the interest of efficiency,
determined the proper use of the tax revenues on the ground of equity,
and found itself undoing in the name of equity what it had done in the ,
name of efficiency, restoring the very evil it set out to correct. This
is a paradox. It cannot be the fault of nature, which has no paradoxes.
The fault must be in the reasoning.
To see that the fault is not in the new reasoning here introduced,
suppose drivers were able to obtain cash payments from their fellows for
bearing their congestion costs. It is irrelevant how this might be
*Evidently, the argument still holds if taxes are returned in
the form of improved roads. In this case congestion will decrease though
usage will be the same as before the tax. Both the tax payment and its
dispersal re1llain functions of usage. The average driver regains by the
saving of time what he pays as tax; at any given rate of usage he is
precisely as well off as before, so his usage will not change.T
accomplished; simply suppose it possible. Obviously, the externality would
then disappear. However, while each driver would see his private cost
rising by the amount he pays his fellows, he would simultaneously see it
falling by the amount his fellows pay him. Since the costs he imposes equal
those he bears, the amount he pays would equal the aJIlount he is paid (on
the average). So even if the drivers paid for their congesting activities
in cash, they would drive precisely as much as they would when the payments
were impractical. The payments-and their cumbersome substitutes, the con-
gestion taxes--serve no purpose.
The fault lies, therefore, in the traditional reasoning. It
enters with the supposition that the externality creates an inefficiency.
The externality surely exists, but its effects are not those of the usual
externality. Here we have no uncompensated costs falling on innocent
.parties.· The only wa::r a driver can impose congestion costs on others
is to bear the costs they impose on him~·andthe only wa::r he can bear
others' costs is to impose costs on them. Though the driver fails to
,
take account of the congestion cost he imposes on others, he does take
account of the congestion costs others impose on him. Since the costs
he bears equal the costs he imposes, it is as if he were in fact paying
his way. He "pays" by bearing the unpaid-for costs of others. This
confines· the.externality to the group that creates it.
The case is precisely the same whenever a good is supp1.ied at
increasing cost. Each additional buyer causes the price to rise for all
buyers. He does not take this rise into account; on the reasoning of
congestion-cost theory, he creates an externality. But he reciprocally
bears. the "externalities" created by other buyers. He cannot escape
these costs except by leaVing the market. Like those he imposes, they•
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increase with his purchases. Clearly, cash or any other material
compensation for these costs would be pointless.
Externalities confined to the group that creates them, and
falling on a person only so far as he is responsible for imposing
them on others, produce no inefficiencies (on the average). The reason
is the (statistically) exact reciprocity of the cost burden. Costs are
not paid for in cash but in kind though exchange of the externalities
themselves. This non-market exchange of externalities has the advantage
of avoiding transactions costs and the disadvantage of accomplishing
.statistical rather than exact compensations. Evidently the advantage
exceeds the disadvantage in the case of road congestion, for we don't
hear many drivers--apart from transportation planners--agitating for
congestion taxes. Probably the advantage exceeds the disadvantage in
many other spheres as well; if so, entirely too much is made of externalities.·
While the paradox issues directly from a simple misuse of the
theory of externalities, it is worth asking how this misuse could have
remained hidden so long from so many able thinkers. The answer lies, I ,
believe, in the penumbra of welfare-economic concepts that surroundthe subject.
The unthinking appeal to such notions as the Utility of Society As A Whole,
the facile construction of those little triangles purporting to measure
it, the readiness to "induce" people to behave in a manner that achieves
it, constitute an approach to social questions that is known to be bankrupt.
This bankruptcy follows from the conjunction of two facts. On the one hand,
except for the rare case of Pareto dominance, modern political economy
requires interpersonal comparisons of utility. Any residual doubt about
this should have finally been resolved by Chipman's and Moore's recent
evaluation [4], which demonstrates that, "judged in relation to its basic9
objective of enabling economists to make welfare prescriptions without
having to make value judgments and, in particular, interpersonal comparisons
of utility, the new Welfare Economics must be considered a failure."* On
the other hand, such comparisons are impossible.
Interpersonal comparisons of utility must be distinguished
from interpersonal evaluations of merit, which everyone makes on mere-
or-less equally justified grounds (economists having no advantage). Such
interpersonal evaluations do not help modern welfare economics, which
claims objective justification for its proposals. The interpersonal
comparisons it needs for this purpose must in some sense show Whether
a proposal would benefit one person more than it would harm another, not
whether the gainer is more meritorious than the loser.** I argue at
length elsewhere [5] that this need cannot be met.
RClad congestion has thus been studied in terms of a framework
whose basic presuppositions are inconsistent. Such a framework itself
*Chipmin and Moore [4, p. 548). See also Osborne [6) for an
argument that implies the same conclusion with respect to Social Welfare
functions.
**I therefore have to dissent from the implication of Chipman's
and Moore t s quoted remark that an interpersonal comparison· of utility is
a species of value judgment.•
•
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generates paradox.* While more careful work within the framework (and
better luck) would have avoided the particular paradox here noticed,
it would eventually have met some paradox in any case. It is not
simply that the framework lets us down in a few difficult cases,
occasionally failing to justify the public policies that we thought
we derived from it. It is inherently wrong, and must necessarily lead
us astray in every case excePt where luck saves us.
.*The paradoxes of Social Utility are far from being the most
repugnant feature of the political economy it spawns. Just as inconsistent
axioms imply every conceivable proposition, so do the empty formulas of
Social Utility justify every conceivable social policy. "When all is said
and done," conclude Chipman and Moore. "the New Welfare Economics has succeeded
in replacing the utilitarian smoke-screen by a still thicker and more terrifying
smoke-screen of its own." [4, p. 581] This smoke-screen is all the more
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